Naming Sovereignty

What’s in a name? A notable quote from Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, it compels a reader to ponder the importance and value a name holds. In the case of dissuading star-crossed lovers, not much, but names historically embody and carry specific meanings, especially when considering their geographic location. New Zealand, for example, is a country whose name has increasingly become a topic of debate among its residents due to its history of colonization. The Te Pāti Māori (the Māori Party) has organized a petition to officially change the name of New Zealand to Aotearoa New Zealand and restore all original Māori place names by 2026.

Aotearoa, though its Māori etymological roots are unknown, has the common translation of “long bright world” or “long white cloud.” Its first use was documented in Sir George Grey’s 1855 Polynesian Mythology, and Ancient Traditional History of the New Zealand Race and numerous times again before regularly entering the colonial lexicon. 

New Zealand, a nation primarily composed of two large islands, is located to the southeast of Australia and abuts the Tasman Sea to the east. Separated by the Cook Strait and several smaller islets, these two halves are commonly referred to as the North and South Islands, with Te Ika-a-Māui (North) and Te Waipounamu (South) as official alternative names (as of 2013). There are also numerous islands which are scattered across the South Pacific Ocean, unified under the flag of New Zealand, which are self-governing and have increasing levels of autonomy, specifically Tokelau, Niue and the Cook Islands (which has had its own discussions regarding changing its colonial name).

The History

The explorer Abel Tasman was the first European explorer to make contact with the Māori people in 1642. Over 120 years passed before another encounter would take place, this time involving James Cook, a British explorer, naval officer and cartographer known for his various expeditions across the globe. As a cartographer, Cook worked on naming locations in New Zealand on maps for a European audience; he occasionally had input from the Māori population. However, Cook, and the Europeans who came after him, often discarded or entirely misunderstood traditional Māori naming practices. A single name for the entirety of New Zealand was not conventionally used until the arrival of colonial settlers who first named the island nation after the coastal province of Zeeland in the Netherlands. Tolaga Bay is another early example of a mistranslation. Cook asked Ūawa locals their name for the bay, but they thought they were being asked the name of the wind and responded with Tāraki, or north wind, which Cook wrote as Tolaga (mistranslations within mistranslations). 

Initially, trade nurtured a positive relationship between Māori and Europeans, which grew into sharing communities, workspaces and the introduction of English literacy. Christian missionaries in the early 1830s began petitioning the United Kingdom to make New Zealand a colony. London was hesitant at first as New Zealand had no central government, making formal agreements with the Māori more difficult. Over the next decade, British representatives worked toward creating a centralized government in New Zealand along with purchasing Māori land to create settlements for British migrants. 

The Treaty of Waitangi, often referred to as New Zealand’s founding document, was signed in 1840 and formalized New Zealand’s status as a British colony. Over 500 prominent Māori leaders endorsed the treaty; however, differing translations between the English and Māori versions ignited a series of conflicts. Hōne Heke, a Ngāpuhi chief and the first signatory to the treaty, felt the British betrayed the terms of the agreement and nonviolently expressed his dissatisfaction by cutting down a British flagpole, located in the settlement of Kororāreka. The flagpole was repaired, and subsequently cut down, a total of three times, igniting the Northern War between the United Kingdom and Māori across the North Islands.

In the years following the wars, opposing notions of sovereignty and land ownership between Māori and Europeans continued over the finite amount of usable land on New Zealand. When settlers began to feel their needs were being overlooked in favor of natives, a new constitution was established in 1852 to form a representative government of New Zealand. Its seats could only be filled by men who owned, leased or rented property of a certain value, which was in direct opposition to the Māori concept of ownership, as they held communal possession of land. As such, they were excluded from any representation in the new colonial government. Along with the spread of disease, this period resulted in the Māori population being almost halved by the 1880s.

Over the following decades, New Zealand settlers continued to expand into Māori land as it was often seen as “wasted space” by colonists. British Protectorates over various islands in the South Pacific Ocean were established as well, to include Tokelau, Niue and the Cook Islands (named after James Cook). By the time New Zealand gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1947, its borders encompassed New Zealand itself, Niue, Tokelau, the Cook Islands and the Ross Dependency.

Fun fact: The Ross Dependency is a wedge of the Antarctic which New Zealand has claimed since 1923. The area is primarily used to conduct research and for fishing. Learn more about this in our blog, Antarctica: Home to Ice, Penguins, and Boundary Disputes.

After Independence

Since independence, New Zealand has slowly worked to repair its relationship with indigenous residents in an attempt to reinforce positive relations across the South Pacific region. As a result, the current legal status of Tokelau, Niue and the Cook Islands deviates from the standard post colonial model.

The Cook Islands were first inhabited by Polynesians who arrived at Rarotonga, the largest island, by canoe around 900 C.E. Additional islands, such as Manihiki, Rakahanga, Pukapuka and Penrhyn, would also become settlements for Tongans and Samoans, with each island acting as its own political entity. 

James Cook sighted the islands in 1773 and named the entire region the Hervey Islands, later renamed the Cook Islands in 1835. The territory became a protectorate of the United Kingdom in 1901 and remained a dependent territory of New Zealand until it was granted internal self-governance as a state in free association in 1965. This meant that although New Zealand would continue to maintain responsibility for the foreign defense of Cook Islands, it would be self-managed in all domestic affairs. 

Made a colony in 1901, Niue, often referred to as “Savage Island” by Europeans, operates on a similar governmental system as the Cook Islands. This means that although the people of Cook Islands and Niue are still considered citizens under the jurisdiction of New Zealand, they are able to operate their own domestic affairs and have been granted the authority to autonomously enter into bilateral treaties.

As the Cook Islands were not considered a unified government prior to colonization, there is no Polynesian name. In recent years, locals have begun to call for a change to the island name to better reflect the nature of the people. The name ‘Avaiki Nui’ was proposed in 1994 but met with widespread resistance. Some modern day Cook Islanders utilize Avaiki Nui, and others the literal Māori translation, Kūki ‘Āirani. However, alternatives to the colonial name Cook Islands remains widely up for debate.

Tokelau, another previous colony associated with New Zealand, comprises three atolls in the South Pacific Ocean known as Atafu, Nukunonu and Fakaofo. Tokelau is an interesting case as New Zealand has never maintained a permanent presence on Tokelau; instead it delegates authority to the Council of Elders, or Taupulega, who are granted power over all administrative and legislative duties. Therefore, Tokelauans have received little foreign influence in their daily lives, and the islands operate under their own political, legal, social, judicial and economic systems. While they are under the authority of the Administrator of Tokelau, a position appointed by New Zealand’s minister of foreign affairs, the current government is largely self-sustaining and able to enter bilateral agreements on its own accord.

Between 2006 and 2007, two referendums were held to determine if Tokelau would become a state in free association, similar to the Cook Islands and Niue. Both votes failed to reach the minimum majority necessary so Tokelau remained a non-self-governing territory of New Zealand. Due to a decolonization program instituted by the United Nations, the question of Tokelau’s right to self-determination was raised again in 2022. Discussions are now underway to determine if a referendum will be held in 2026 to vote on Tokelau’s independence from New Zealand, who is in support of Tokelau’s ongoing efforts.

Since Tokelau and the States in free association with New Zealand can operate independently on an international level, they have entered into maritime boundary agreements with each other, despite technically being part of New Zealand. Tokelau and the Cook Islands determined their maritime boundary in 2010, while Niue and the Cook Islands determined theirs in 2012.

What comes next?

New Zealand’s relationship with the Māori people is still developing, and though it seems positive overall, a 2024 bill was introduced which would alter the original terms of the Treaty of Waitangi. Introduced by Act, a right-wing political party, leaders in the party have stated they want equal rights for all citizens and having provisions in place for people based on their ethnicities is “divisive for New Zealand society.” Citizens quickly voiced their opposition to the bill along with Māori representatives who protested by performing the haka in parliament. Objections to the bill are widespread and it is unlikely to progress further. 

While it is still uncertain if New Zealand will add Aotearoa to its official name, many have already taken it on as part of their personal and national identities. The name has even appeared on New Zealand’s national currency. While alternative names are also up for debate, the support behind renaming New Zealand stems from Māori ideology, which believes that a name is intrinsic to where and how you were born. In renaming the places they colonized, European settlers stripped indigenous people of their connections to the land, weakened their sovereignty and enforced a rule of law that was diametrically opposed to the Māori way of life. In using the name Aotearoa, Māori are reclaiming their sovereignty and their culture. New Zealand is also demonstrating a unique governing system that actively works to unify its people and uplift those who were previously oppressed.

By Zander Bamford-Brown

A look into disputes over the very meaning of sovereignty 

Nearly all the work we do at Sovereign Limits documenting international boundaries can be depicted by a few different kinds of lines on a map. We can illustrate contested boundaries and sovereignty disputes with a simple legend: a red dot for a disputed territory, a dashed line for a unilateral boundary claim and a solid line for an uncontested border. This is the visual expression of the current framework for international relations based on the Westphalian system. The Westphalian system serves as a common language through which key ideas like state, territory, borders and sovereignty have a universal meaning across the world. Through this shared language and set of principles, even sovereignty disputes can be discussed in a mutually intelligible manner. However, this is a limited viewpoint, and this post is about those places where the Westphalian system is not a shared language, where the people dispute the principles of this ideology and assert their own differing interpretations of sovereignty.

The Westphalian system was developed over the past three centuries and has come to replace most of the diversity in the organization of polities that had existed up until this point. The basic assertions of this system are that states have a monopoly on force within their territories and that states are the agents that conduct international relations. This amounts to a system of legally equal states with territorial integrity that are legitimized, in part, through mutual recognition. There is no room in this system for things other than territorial states to have sovereignty. Although some scholars argue we are now in a ‘Post-Westphalian’ system, its core components still remain central to international relations.

When this system was developed, primarily by Europeans in the late 18th century, it was quite a shift from many of the other models that had been used up until that point. For our work, the most important shift was the adoption of linear boundaries. Most European territories were not defined by linear boundaries until after the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815 and even later in other parts of the world. This emphasis on linear cartographic boundaries, which had been developed during the European colonization of the Americas, has become a crucial component of the system. The Westphalian system views territory as the only legitimate source of sovereignty and that the only way to define territory is through linear boundaries. This concept is succinctly captured in a definition of Westphalian sovereignty by Stephen D. Krasner as “the ability of states to control movement across their borders.” It is the boundary, and control over that boundary, that makes a state sovereign.

The extent of cartographic understanding of the world shortly after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. From the Library of Congress.

Despite the apparent universality of this system, which maps the political divisions of the world, the Westphalian system is generally understood to be a model. In reality, these principles have been regularly broken since the system was developed. One arena where this is visible is in the interactions between forms of sovereignty that predate the introduction of the Westphalian system by colonial forces. These forms of sovereignty, sometimes referred to as Indigenous sovereignty, are quite diverse but in general do not consider territory as the primary source of sovereignty. It is argued that these notions of sovereignty are incompatible with Westphalian sovereignty, giving rise to a class of sovereignty disputes and border regimes that cannot be explained fully within the Westphalian framework. 

Below I discuss how this interaction plays out between groups in two different Westphalian border areas: pastoralists along the Kenya-Uganda frontier and a Mohawk community along the Canada-United States international boundary. There are other similar disputes playing out around the world that affect both internal politics and international relations and these two cases highlight the diverse nature of these types of disputes.

The Karamoja Cluster and movement across the Kenya-Uganda border

For more about the Westphalian sovereignty of the Kenya–Uganda boundary, check out our Boundary Brief!

The Karamoja Cluster is a region that spans the northern portions of Kenya and Uganda, as well as parts of South Sudan and Ethiopia. The Cluster is very diverse and, to keep things simple, I am just looking at movement across the Kenya-Uganda border. Before British colonial forces came to East Africa and created what would become the modern-day countries of Kenya and Uganda, there were no strong centralized states. Instead, the primary political structure of the people in the region was the ethnic community. It was through the ethnic community that people built their governments and laid claim to territory, with some polities described as operating “almost at a comparable level with modern states.” While many of the groups in the Cluster claimed a bounded territory, the territory was not the legitimizing force behind political authority, and as these groups were pastoralists, the borders were more fluid. 

As one can imagine, the traditional borders of these pastoralist groups do not align with the British-made Kenya-Uganda frontier, and the international border today is often crossed during livestock raids and in search of pasture. A 2019 paper by a team of Kenyan researchers found that in the Kenyan-Ugandan border zone, the “traditional concept of borders—as defined by physical features and historical memories—still govern the movement of the pastoralists.” This movement is often necessary to keep herds alive in times of drought. A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) brief even went as far as criticizing the “artificiality of state borders” as a constraint to pastoralism in the Karamoja Cluster and, by extension, the wellbeing of pastoralists.

The pastoralists in the Karamoja Cluster are not passive in this process; the UNDP brief emphasizes that the pastoralists have never accepted these national borders. Their continued use of traditional forms of security, governance and borders, as well as their resistance to this new form of sovereignty, are the primary reasons that “the nation-state still exists as an unaccomplished project in the [Kenya-Uganda border] zone.” Both the Kenyan and Ugandan governments, along with the British before them, have attempted to assert their sovereignty over this region. Yet the assertions have “yielded minimal results on the ground.” In short, though the people in this region are claimed as members of States, they have never been fully brought under its control. As pastoralists often disregard Westphalian borders and its notions of territoriality, their movements amount to an assertion of their own autonomy and sovereignty.  

Map of the Karamoja Cluster across South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Cartography updated from Figure 1 in “Introducing pathways to resilience in the Karamoja Cluster.”

The most legible assertion of autonomy by these groups was a Peace Accord between the Turkana of Kenya and the Matheniko of Uganda. The 1978 Lokiriama Peace Accord put an end to what had become an uneven power relation in cattle raids following a ban by the Ugandan government on the carrying of weapons. These inter-group raids are a longstanding practice in the Cluster but have become increasingly deadly with the introduction of firearms and further incentivized by a growing commercial black market for cattle. In the signing of the Accord, the two groups conducted international affairs, something typically reserved for states in the Westphalian system. Both groups have since used their alliance to cross into the territory of the other and skirt restrictions imposed by either government. This directly undermines the sovereignty of these states and shows that the pastoralists had sufficient sovereignty to create an international agreement related to cross-border movement.

That being said, Kenya and Uganda still can and do assert their control over the border. A clear example of this is restricting people from entering their territory with weapons. In 2023, the Ugandan government passed an executive order banning Turkanans, one of the large pastoralist groups in Kenya, from entering Uganda with guns. Direct statements by the Turkana are hard to come by, but a quote by one Turkana elder in the wake of this new executive order may hint at their political position: “We want to be allowed back to Uganda to graze our animals, we were born pastoralists, and we have no borders, will die as a pastoralist not Ugandan or Kenyan.” In this statement the elder is refuting the right of the state not only to impose borders and control his movement but to claim him as a member of the nation, identifying instead as a ‘pastoralist’. For this elder, his movement across the international border is based on a political view that disputes not just the sovereignty of Kenya and Uganda, but the entire philosophy of Westphalian sovereignty and borders.  

The categorization of this situation is further complicated by the fact that the Kenyan and Ugandan governments have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which allows for the free movement of unarmed people across the border. In some ways, this MoU formalizes the shared sovereignty between pastoralists and the Kenyan and Ugandan governments and brings their movements into the Westphalian system. With an open international border, the pastoralist groups can continue to assert their own boundaries, as they traditionally have done, without officially infringing on the sovereignty of the states. As scholars have concluded that neither government has been able to exert ‘supreme authority’ in the region or over the border for extended periods of time, it suggests that sovereignty is shared with the pastoralist groups of the Karamoja Cluster. 

The current situation along the Kenya-Uganda border makes the most essential question of our research difficult to answer: what are the sovereign limits of each country? How does one map two Westphalian states who claim contiguous areas but whose control on the ground is shared with groups who hold an incompatible form of sovereignty with ‘no borders’ or, at minimum, a different understanding of borders. Sometimes a written piece like this one is needed to express what a map cannot when Westphalian sovereignty is tenuous at best.

Akwesasne and nested sovereignty along the Canada–United States border

For more about the established interantional boundary bewteen Canada and the United States, see our Boundary Brief.

The Mohawk community of Akwesasne, which is split by the Canada–United States international boundary, is another indigenous group experiencing conflict due to Westphalian sovereignty, but in a different context. The discussion of this border community serves as a complement to the Kenyan–Ugandan frontier because the sovereignty and border regime is marked by a much larger degree of direct government involvement. Together they show how Indigenous sovereignty can impact borders in a range of historical and political situations. 

As in the Karamoja Cluster, the assertion of Indigenous sovereignty in Akwesasne, the largest Mohawk community, creates a border regime that is not entirely in the control of the States. Akwesasne is divided into three reservations in different jurisdictions: Kawehno:ke (or Cornwall Island) in Ontario, an area in Quebec, and an adjacent area in the United States. Kawehno:ke is connected by bridges on either side to non-reservation land. The area in Quebec is cut off by rivers on two sides and only accessible by land from the United States. The part of Akwesasne in the United States is well connected to surrounding areas in the US.

A map of the Akwesasne territory divided between two Canadian states (Quebec and Ontario) and New York, US, from Akwesasne Travel.

Between the US and the Quebec sections of Akwesasne, border control stations are conspicuously absent, allowing for an unimpeded flow of people across the otherwise well-regulated international boundary. A journalist visiting the area found himself struggling to keep track of how many times he crossed through what are termed ‘unstaffed road crossings.’ For someone traveling in Akwesasne, the Mohawk community could be seen to supersede Canada or the US, merging two distinct states into a single, non-Westphalian entity. 

This alone points to an atypical border regime but there is an example of an even clearer assertion of sovereignty by the Mohawk. In 2009, Canada implemented a national policy where border agents were required to carry guns. Mohawks in Akwesasne protested this policy change with the Chief saying: 

“[The Canada Border Service Agency] is a foreign oppressive force who occupies our sovereign community and territory. [They are] unwelcome, uninvited and now carrying firearms. For lack of a different description, that is considered by some an act of war.”

The night the policy went into effect, Mohawks gathered at the Canadian border station on the island in protest, and the agents stationed there left their posts. The station was never staffed again. After talks between Mohawk leaders and the Canadian government a new border crossing post was built beyond the reservation. That is, the Mohawk were able to assert their sovereignty over Kawehno:ke. Through their protest the Mohawk were able to deny the State the right to (1) carry weapons, and by extension use force, on their territory, and (2) effectively control the movement over their border. This is only made more salient by the Canadian government’s acceptance of these assertions, as shown through the construction of a new border post. 

Out of this process came a hard-to-categorize border situation between the United States and both portions of Akwesasne in Canada. When a person drives from the US to Kawehno:ke or Mohawk territory in Quebec, they enter Canada without going through border control. They could go shopping, stay a few nights with a friend, and return to the US without ever coming in contact with Canadian border services. If you didn’t know any better, you may think that you are only entering Mohawk territory and not Canada. An Akwesasne resident could grow up regularly crossing the border without ever having their movement controlled by the State. This community serves as an example of what some call ‘nested sovereignty,’ a product of the reservation system used in the US and Canada. Audra Simpson, a Mohawk scholar, argues that nested sovereignty “has implications for the sturdiness of nation-states” because the Westphalian system does not allow for overlapping sovereignty. One can see that clearly when the nested sovereignty crosses an international border.  

The example of the Kawehno:ke border crossing in many ways falls into the Westphalian system: it is a group (the Mohawk) asserting their sovereignty and monopoly on force in a bounded territory (a reservation). A crucial departure within the Westphalian framework is that the Mohawk are not internationally recognized as sovereign. Yet there is another departure, the political ideology of the Mohawk. Taiaiake Alfred, a Mohawk scholar, frames the issue of Indigenous struggles for autonomy as follows: “We already are sovereign in the philosophical sense, so to reorient ourselves in order to enter a form of relationship with a state, we have to sacrifice part of who we are.” Alfred sees the bases of Westphalian sovereignty as “abhorrent to an Indigenous philosophy and worldview.” But how can you map philosophical sovereignty? In order to retain some autonomy in the face of colonialism, Indigenous people in North America have, in some instances, chosen to engage on Westphalian terms. We can see this process through the Kawehno:ke border crossing and the reservation system as a whole. This process has taken place in the context of conversations in Indigenous communities about whether this is the right path for a group whose philosophy and sovereignty claims are based on an incompatible set of principles.

Much like in the Karamoja Cluster, the interactions between the Akwesasne community, Canada, and the United States have related to territorial boundaries and how to manage two irreconcilable notions of sovereignty. In both these cases, claims by Indigenous people of their own sovereignty has impacted cross border movement by limiting the role of the state in regulating it. These processes show how Indigenous assertions of sovereignty continue to impact border regimes in a variety of contexts and levels of state control, and how international relations and border regimes cannot be fully explained in the context of the Westphalian system nor solely on the basis of Indigenous sovereignty. 

The cases outlined here are part of a multifaceted history where contesting Westphalian sovereignty is as old as the system itself. The Westphalian system was created through interactions with Indigenous concepts of sovereignty and the continued interaction between the two may be a useful nexus to understand future developments in the system of international relations and borders. Lastly, it is important to give a voice to the people who have had their ability to access land, and through that their livelihood, curtailed through the colonial system and the Westphalian sovereignty that came with it.