By Zander Bamford-Brown

The Rafah Crossing Point is the only official crossing for people between Egypt and the Palestinian territory of Gaza. The crossing is a lifeline for Gazans enduring the ongoing blockade by Israel and Egypt, and it is one of only two places where people can officially enter and exit the Gaza Strip. As with many aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this crossing has a complex history. Below we have produced a timeline of the groups that have had direct control over this crossing. It is important to note that this timeline is a macro-scale view of the diplomatic relations surrounding the control of the official crossing. The reality for people, especially Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, is far more intricate. There are other official, unofficial, and illicit levels of control that impact the movement of people through this crossing. For example, while the Rafah border crossing was closed, a system of tunnels between Gaza and Egypt allowed goods and people to cross the border illegally. Conversely, even during the most open times there were significant border closures and individual restrictions imposed by Israel and Egypt on Gaza.

Zander wrote the code for this timeline as part of a class on the Geospatial Web at McGill University.

Background on the Gaza Strip and Palestine

The State of Palestine is a de jure state that has received recognition from a majority of United Nations member States. Palestine claims the discontiguous territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip is a densely populated Palestinian exclave between southwestern Israel and Egypt. The area has a population of over 2 million, roughly two thirds of whom are registered refugees. Prior to 1948, the territories of Palestine and Israel were part of the British Mandate of Palestine. The mandate’s boundary with Egypt was based on a 1906 Treaty (see our Egypt Palestine (Gaza) Boundary Brief for a detailed description and analysis of the boundary). In 1949, Egypt took control of Gaza which it occupied until the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Israel directly occupied Gaza from 1967 until 2005. In 2005 Israel ‘disengaged’ from Gaza, however, Israel has maintained significant control over Gaza’s borders and is still widely considered by the international community to be an occupying force.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) is the governing body that is tasked with the ‘municipal’ and internal affairs of Palestine. The PA has also come to take a role in representing Palestine internationally. Hamas is a militant Islamic Palestinian political party and organization. Hamas has been in control of Gaza since it won the PA legislative elections in 2006. In 2007 a violent conflict between Hamas and Fatah, the other large political party in the Palestinian legislature, led to Hamas gaining sole de facto control over Gaza while Fatah and the PA retained control of the West Bank. A handful of states, including Israel and the United States, consider Hamas to be a terrorist organization. Many other states consider Hamas’ military wing to be a terrorist organization.

For more on the international boundary between Egypt and Palestine, check out our Boundary Brief.

By Alex Marsh

First discovered in 1840, Antarctica has long been the subject of intrigue in the international community. As the region’s ice continues to recede, increasing access to the area has prompted renewed scrutiny of states’ maritime and territorial claims.

The Antarctic Treaty System

The Antarctic is unique in that it is the only continent on earth with no native human population, and therefore, no government. As interest in the region intensified in the mid-20^th century, states recognized the need for international cooperation. As a result, Antarctica is governed by the Antarctic Treaty System, a collection of agreements and treaties that commits signatories to responsible and cooperative behavior in the region. The basis of the treaty system is a recognition by all states party to the treaty that, “it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord.” As of 2022, 54 states are party to the Antarctic Treaty System, including all states which maintain territorial claims (or the right to assert a claim) in Antarctica.

The portion of the Antarctic Treaty System that concerns territorial claims and sovereignty is contained in the system’s founding document, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. Despite the general spirit of cooperation in the Antarctic Treaty, Article 4 makes clear that those countries that had previously made territorial claims to Antarctica would not be renouncing them and that the agreement itself was in no way intended to establish any form of official recognition of any one countries claim.

Territorial Claims

A total of seven states have made land claims in Antarctica: France (Adélie Land), Argentina (Argentine Antarctica), Australia (Australian Antarctic Territory), the United Kingdom (British Antarctic Territory), Chile (Chilean Antarctic Territory), Norway (Peter I Island & Queen Maud Land), and New Zealand (Ross Dependency). These territorial claims are only recognized by the aforementioned seven states, and not unanimously. The United Kingdom, Argentina, and Chile have overlapping claims, and thus do not recognize each other’s claims. Land claims made by the seven states are conical in shape, extending outwards from the south pole to the Antarctic coast. The sole exception to this rule is the Norwegian claim, whose southern and northern limits remain undefined. The United States, Russia, Peru, and Uruguay have all reserved their right to make a claim, but as of 2022 have not done so.

Maritime Claims

Maritime claims in the Antarctic are the subject of some dispute. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Antarctic Treaty System ostensibly clash in this area, with differing interpretations by different parties. Since the 1959 Antarctic Treaty only commits states to pausing “territorial” claims, some parties have argued it does not apply to maritime claims, or that it contradicts the rights of states to file extended continental shelf claims under Article 76 of UNCLOS. Historically, submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) by states with territorial claims in the Antarctic explicitly requested that the CLCS not consider data from Antarctica, so as to avoid antagonizing parties to the Antarctic Treaty System by making new claims.

Australia, however, included their claimed “Australian Antarctic Territory” in their 2004 submission to the CLCS. The CLCS found that Australia’s claim was scientifically valid, delimiting not only the Australian Antarctic Territory’s ECS boundaries, but also claimed limits for a territorial sea and 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Argentina and Norway followed suit in 2009 with submissions to the CLCS that included their antarctic claims, and the United Kingdom and Chile have also declared their intent to file similar claims.

If you’re interested in learning more about the boundary weirdness of the extended continental shelf, check out this blog, which includes information on the claims of Antarctica’s polar opposite.

Research Outposts

While they are not a form of territorial claim, there are nonetheless a significant number of research outposts in Antarctica. There are 92 seasonal and full-time research stations in Antarctica, operated by 42 states (all members of the Antarctic Treaty System) and a total crew ranging anywhere between 1,000–4,000 scientists and researchers. The operation of a research station does not constitute a territorial claim under the Antarctic Treaty System, which states, “No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica.” As such, many states operate research outposts in territory claimed by other states with no issues. Scientific cooperation in the Antarctic is another principle of the Antarctic Treaty System, so the construction and operation of these outposts are not typically cause for dispute.

As the global climate continues to change, interest in the Antarctic is only expected to increase. Numerous states that have reserved their right to make territorial claims have begun seriously examining the possibility, while others, such as Australia, test the boundaries of the Antarctic Treaty System’s constraints on sovereignty claims. The Antarctic will continue to be an area of global interest, territorial dispute, and scientific research.

By: Alex Marsh

Extended continental shelf (ECS) claims have become increasingly important to coastal states due to emerging technology and a changing climate that has opened new possibilities for resource extraction, but what exactly are these far out maritime features?

“Normal” continental shelf claims as defined in Article 76 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond [a coastal state’s] territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured…” In other words, the continental shelf is the natural extension of a state’s landmass into the ocean, at a maximum distance of 200 nautical miles (M) from a state’s claimed baselines.

But there are many areas where the geography of the continental shelf extends beyond 200 M, and in these places, coastal states can submit an extended continental shelf claim for an area up to 350 nautical miles from their baselines if it can be proven that this area is still a natural extension of their land territory.

Continental shelf claims are valuable because of the rights they grant coastal states over the claimed area. Articles 77 and 81 of UNCLOS establish that a state entitled to an area of continental shelf retains the exclusive right to explore and exploit the natural resources located on or in the shelf. These rights extend to mineral/non-living resources as well as seabed organisms. Coastal states are not, however, granted sovereignty over the sea or airspace above a continental shelf entitlement.

If a state believes it is entitled to an area of continental shelf beyond 200 M, it will submit data and information supporting its claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a UN body composed of scientific experts responsible for adjudicating extended continental shelf claims. After consideration of the submission, the CLCS will then issue a binding recommendation on the scientific validity of the state’s claim.

There are many scenarios where more than one state will lay claim to the same area of extended continental shelf. When this occurs, the states will submit their supporting data to the CLCS, who will then provide a recommendation on the validity of each state’s continental shelf claim. The CLCS does not, however, set the boundary between the two states but may only provide a recommendation on whether each state’s claim is scientifically valid. It is then up to the various claimants to negotiate an ECS boundary.

Coastal states have 10 years from the date they ratified UNCLOS to submit extended continental shelf claims. For example, Canada ratified UNCLOS in 2003, and needed to submit any extended continental shelf claims to the CLCS by 2013. A state may then later amend or supplement submissions. Canada deposited its initial ECS claims for the Atlantic Ocean in 2013 and added an area of Arctic Ocean ECS in 2019. States that are not signatories to UNCLOS, such as the United States, are unable to submit extended continental shelf claims to the CLCS, but they do still have ECS claims. The United States is currently working on its extended continental shelf claim.

Extended continental shelf claims involving only one state are typically non-controversial if they are deemed scientifically valid. For example, the area of high sea known as the “Peanut Hole” in the Sea of Okhotsk was declared part of the Russian continental shelf by the CLCS in 2014 without much fanfare.

Notable extended continental shelf claims in recent years have primarily involved areas of overlapping claims. Overlapping claims naturally receive more attention and can take far longer to resolve. Denmark (Faroe Islands), Norway (including Jan Mayen), and Iceland recently ratified agreements to delimit their extended continental shelf entitlements in an area of the Norwegian Sea known as the “Banana Hole.” All three states submitted their supporting information to the CLCS with the understanding that once it was confirmed that their claims were scientifically valid, they would establish boundaries according to a preliminary trilateral agreement negotiated in 2006 and made official in 2019 after the decision of the CLCS.

Another example of overlapping claims can be observed in the marine Ontong Java Plateau, located in the southern Pacific Ocean. Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands all have overlapping continental shelf claims in the area. Since all three small island states believe they are entitled to a portion of the area, they decided to pool their time and resources to make a joint submission to the CLCS to establish the outer limits of their overlapping claim rather than submit competing claims for portions of the plateau. Once the CLCS establishes the outer limits of the “claimable” area, the area will belong to all three states jointly until they choose to begin trilateral negotiations to delimit boundaries.

Perhaps the most prominent area of overlapping ECS claim are those in the Arctic Ocean. As climate change makes the region more accessible to economic activity, arctic coastal states are acting with increased urgency to ensure their access to large deposits of natural resources underneath the melting icecap. Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia have all made overlapping claims in the region, and the United States is working towards publishing its ECS claim in the disputed waters.

The extended continental shelf is very much the next frontier of maritime boundary delimitation as technology improves to allow for coastal states to exploit the distant continental shelf resources, climate change makes portions of the ECS more accessible, and the global reliance on fossil fuels leads to interest in extracting hydrocarbon resources from novel locations.

By Zander Bamford-Brown

The Kazungula Bridge, as if out of a fairytale, crosses the Zambezi River in a place that does not exist, at least not according to most maps. It is not in some remote mountainous area nor is it a unimportant bridge; it is the sole border crossing between Botswana and Zambia. Their border, nestled between Namibia and Zimbabwe on the Zambezi River, is the shortest in the world. It is so short that it can’t be depicted on smaller scale maps. 

Instead of depicting the Botswana–Zambia border, maps will instead show a single point where the countries of Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe allegedly meet. This has led to the border being called a ‘quadripoint area,’ because it is currently the closest thing on earth to a quadripoint international boundary (where four countries meet). Though many maps, and the term quadripoint area, negate the presence of the Botswana–Zambia border, it does in fact exist.

The 135 meters (443 feet) of river, just enough to fit the Kazungula Bridge, creates an economic block, disrupting trade between Zimbabwe and Namibia. Any travel between the two nations must first go through another country. Conversely, the Kazungula Bridge allows free trade between Zambia and Botswana. This has been a matter of contention for Zimbabwe. Before the construction of the bridge, most Botswana–Zambia trade was moved through Zimbabwe and was taxed by the government. The construction of the bridge, which was completed during the COVID-19 pandemic and opened in May 2021, once both nations reopened their border, means that Zimbabwe will lose that revenue. However, since the boundary is not a true quadripoint, Zimbabwe does not have the power to stop two nations from building a bridge over their shared border. 

For more information on the five international boundaries that meet at the “Quadripoint,” check out our Boundaries pages:

Botswana–Namibia, Botswana–Zambia, Botswana–Zimbabwe, Namibia–Zambia, and Zambia–Zimbabwe.

And a Few Other Canada–United States Boundary Oddities

By Marissa Wood & Harrison Boyle

This blog was created using ArcGIS StoryMaps, and for the best viewing experience, we recommend visiting this page.

A Very Brief Overview to an Incredibly Complex Region

By Zander Bamford-Brown

The global economic and geopolitical importance of the South China Sea (SCS) dispute far outpaces that of any other boundary dispute we have discussed to date. Half of all the fishing vessels in the world are located in the waters of the South China Sea. There are also large reserves of oil and natural gas and “some of the world’s most important shipping lanes;” these routes carry more than a fifth of all goods (by value) shipped each year. 

Seven states border the South China Sea: China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam. I list Taiwan as a separate state despite its disputed sovereignty because they have a unique claim in the South China Sea and independently occupy some of the disputed features. Each of the seven littoral countries have individual, overlapping, and disputed claim lines to South China Sea maritime territory.

There are five main groups of disputed islands in the South China Sea which are labeled on the map below. The largest (and most contested) are the Spratly Islands, which are a collection of hundreds of islets and reefs extending from near the coast of the Philippines and Borneo Island towards Vietnam. Then come the Paracel Islands which are located to the north between Vietnam and China, and far to their southeast is the completely submerged Macclesfield Bank, and yet further southeast is Scarborough Shoal. To the north, roughly equidistant from Hong Kong and Taiwan are the Pratas Islands. 

Creating Islands

A 2016 Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled on a case concerning maritime entitlements of the disputed features in the South China Sea brought before it by the Philippines against China. This case set a precedent for how the South China Sea dispute should be examined under international law. The Tribunal determined that none of the features in the South China Sea could naturally sustain human habitation or economic life on their own and therefore could not generate a 200 nautical mile (M) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claim. This decision by the PCA should limit the claims from all high-tide features to a 12 M territorial sea. China refused to participate in the case and does not accept the ruling. Furthermore, all of the littoral states, except the Philippines, continue to claim that the features they occupy are in fact entitled to a 200 M EEZ. The Tribunal did not rule on international maritime boundaries.

While the Tribunal attempted to classify the features they reviewed based on their composition before they were impacted by humans, many features have been drastically altered to now be able to sustain human and economic life. China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan have transformed the features they occupy to include structures such as runways, buildings, deep harbors, military installations, and tourist attractions. Take for example the transformation of Fiery Cross Reef by China which can be seen below. From 2014 to 2020, China dredged and built up the reef which was formerly almost entirely submerged. Besides the runway and deep harbor, the reef now houses defense and administration buildings and energy production facilities. 

However, not all transformation projects are solely for military uses. Southwest Cay (Đảo Song Tử Tây) is occupied by Vietnam and though it has military structures the leafy island also has facilities for young children (visible on Google Maps photos). Malaysia in turn developed Swallow Reef (Pulau Layang-Layang) for the general public as a scuba diving destination fully equipped with an airport and a resort.

A Note on the Environmental Impact

Making the features, especially submerged reefs, habitable usually involves dredging, breaking up coral and covering coral reefs with sand and concrete. This can completely wipe out any ecosystem that existed on and around the feature and, by changing the seabed, can impact many other marine habitats. However, there are also environmental impacts caused by this dispute which are quotidian and less visible. 

The tactics used by the littoral states to solidify their claims include fishing, hydrocarbon extraction, and militarization. These three methods all have insidious impacts on the waters of the South China Sea. Overfishing is a serious problem in the disputed waters of the sea, fish stocks are now only between 5% and 30% of what they were in 1950. Since most of the fish is consumed locally, continued overfishing will not only have severe economic but also nutritional impacts.

Not only are military bases and vessels huge sources of greenhouse gasses but their runoff can pollute waters as well. Finally, hydrocarbon extraction can have localized impacts through the destructive process of drilling and, potentially, leaks and spills. While the impacts of this dispute may reverberate around the globe, we must also remember that it is having a local impact and that the people who live on its shores are the ones who will bear the brunt of the environmental impact.  

The Claims of Each State

China claims more of the South China Sea than any other nation. The “nine-dash line” claim, as it is called, is a set of nine line segments that, when connected, cover 90% of the marine area. Their claim overlaps with the claims of every other littoral state and includes the entirety of all five feature groups described above. They occupy the Paracel Islands and many features in the Spratly Islands.

Taiwan, which is claimed by China, has historically claimed all of China, and shares China’s claim to the waters of the South China Sea. The Taiwanese refer to the claim as the “U-shaped line.” Historically, Taiwan claimed sovereignty of all of the waters within the U-shaped line (as China does). However, they have recently adjusted the phrasing of their claim to instead be limited to the individual features within the SCS and the territorial waters generated by these features as would be compliant with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This may have been done with the intention of making their claim more valid in international courts and palatable to the international community. Taiwan occupies the Pratas Islands and Itu Aba Island in the Spratly Island Group.

Vietnam claims the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and much of the Spratly Island Group.

They occupy many features in the Spratly Islands. Tensions between China and Vietnam over the disputed waters are often high, and China fishes and sends oil exploration teams in waters claimed by Vietnam, occasionally even sending ships very near the Vietnamese coast in a display of force. While the Vietnamese government has confronted China and even threatened to take them to an international court over the dispute, Vietnam shares close economic ties to China and will likely not escalate the dispute further.

The Philippines occupies nine features in the Spratly Islands, but they claim most of the island group. They also claim the unoccupied Scarborough Shoal which is within their 200 M EEZ and therefore should fall under their uncontested sovereignty according to the rules of UNCLOS. To complicate international relations further, they also claim the Malaysian state of Sabah. 

Malaysia, in turn, also claims a number of features within the Spratly Island Group some of which they occupy. One of the reefs they occupy is Swallow Reef (Pulau Layang-Layang), a renowned scuba diving spot. 

Brunei is enclaved by Malaysian territory and waters. The two nations have come to an agreement on their maritime boundaries and have agreed to a partnership on transboundary oil field explorations. All of the waters claimed by Brunei are also claimed by China and Taiwan.

Indonesia is unique in the fact that it does not claim any of the actual features in the South China Sea, only a section of the sea north of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands. Part of this area falls within China’s nine-dash line claim, and Chinese law enforcement and fishing vessels have repeatedly entered the disputed area.

This post should only serve as an introduction to the incredibly complicated geopolitical, economic, and environmental picture of the South China Sea. Additional blogs could be written about the strategies for mapping such a disputed maritime region, how navies (including those of foreign nations) and fishing boats are being used in sovereignty claims, and provide greater details on the environmental catastrophe of island building. To end on an uplifting note, despite all of the tensions in the South China Sea there is a good deal of cooperation among the littoral states to manage the waters. Hopefully this cooperation can eventually be extended into a peaceful resolution of this dispute. 

For more information on the South China Sea dispute, check out our Sovereignty Analysis.

A Walk Through the World’s Weirdest Borders
By Safania Romas

For the full ArcGIS StoryMaps experience, check out this page.